

APPEAL NO. 033033  
FILED JANUARY 12, 2004

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on October 22, 2003. The hearing officer determined that the respondent's (claimant) compensable injury of \_\_\_\_\_, extends to and includes left shoulder tendonitis; that the claimant had disability from May 14, 2001, to March 26, 2003; that the claimant attained maximum medical improvement (MMI) on May 14, 2001; and that the claimant's impairment rating (IR) is zero percent, as certified by the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission-selected designated doctor, whose opinion was not overcome by the great weight of contrary medical evidence. The appellant (carrier) appeals the extent-of-injury and disability determinations on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. There is no response in the file from the claimant. The determinations of MMI and IR have not been appealed and have become final. Section 410.169.

DECISION

Affirmed.

We have held that the question of the extent of an injury is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given to the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

In the present case, there was simply conflicting evidence on the extent of the injury, and it was the province of the hearing officer to resolve these conflicts. Applying

the above standard of review, we find that the hearing officer's decision was sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record.

Disability means the "inability because of a compensable injury to obtain and retain employment at wages equivalent to the preinjury wage." Section 401.011(16). The determination as to an employee's disability is a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 92147, decided May 29, 1992. The evidence sufficiently supports the hearing officer's determination that the claimant had disability for the period indicated.

We affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CT CORPORATION SYSTEM  
350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET  
DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.**

---

Michael B. McShane  
Appeals Panel  
Manager/Judge

CONCUR:

---

Gary L. Kilgore  
Appeals Judge

---

Edward Vilano  
Appeals Judge